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Resumen
La actual crisis financiera desde finales de 2008 ha devuelto a la actualidad
las propuestas de Keynes, incluida la propuesta de crear una moneda inter-
nacional (Bancor). El artículo reflexiona sobre algunas de estas medidas, la
eficacia de las políticas monetarias, la creciente desigualdad de los ingresos,
el nuevo papel de los bancos, las estrategias políticas de los gobiernos ante la
crisis y las oportunidades para combinar la recuperación con medidas que
favorezcan un desarrollo más sostenible.
Abstract
Since late 2008, together with the current financial crisis we can see a return
of the Keynes’s proposals, including the proposal to create an international
currency (Bancor). This paper reflects on some of these measures, the effec-
tiveness of monetary policies, the growing income inequality, the new role of
banks, political strategies of governments to address the crisis and the oppor-
tunities for combining the economical recovery with measures to promote a
more sustainable development.
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“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady
stream of enterprise. But the position is seriouswhen
enterprise becomes the bubble on the whirlpool of
speculation. When the capital development of a country
becomes a by-product of the activities of a
casino, the job is likely to be ill done “
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
It is being said by some that everyone in the current crisis is a Keynesian  in
believing that governments must spend their way out of a crisis rather than
cutting back their spending. But it is not recognised that Keynes meant spen-
ding on job creation and especially on capital projects, not just bailing out the
speculators. Others regard Keynes as just too passe’. He was arguing for state
spending when states still had power to act on their own. In a globalised
world economy this is no longer possible. This is to underrate Keynes. He
spent the whole of the last years of his life proposing the creation of interna-
tional institutions –a world bank, an International Clearing Union,
International Trade Organisation, even a world money - BANCOR to ensure
that nation states acted together. The fact that his proposals for world finan-
cial institutions were taken over by the United States as instruments of
American power, trade was left to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), there was to be no Clearing Union and the US dollar became the
world’s currency, was not Keynes’s intention at all. In the current financial cri-
sis all Keynes’s proposals are being resurrected. They had had an earlier
rebirth in the recession of the early 1990s when, on the advice of Stuart
Holland and Ken Coates in the European Parliament, the EU President
Jacques Delors had proposed to stimulate European employment through a
major European investment fund. It did not happen, but it was all written
down by Stuart Holland in his Towards a New Bretton Woods published by
Spokesman, 1994 (summarised in the chapter on Keynes in my Models in
Political Economy, Penguin, 1995).
What is interesting is that the current revival of Keynes’s proposal for an
international money, BANCOR, is being proposed by the Chinese authorities,
who up till now have been the main holders of their currency reserves in US
dollars. Without these Chinese holdings the vast US foreign debt would be
unmanageable and the US would lose the advantage of it financial dominan-
ce. It is hardly likely that the US will give up their position lightly or that the
Chinese will wish to keep their funds in dollars for ever. The outcome is
unpredictable, but it is noteworthy that the immediate response of the
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European Financial Authorities was that any extension of the Special
Drawings Rights invented by the International Monetary Fund in 1969 to pro-
vide a supplementary reserve currency for countries in difficulty with their
balance of payments would be dangerously inflationary. The Chinese autho-
rities had suggested that these Special Drawing Rights might become the
basis for a revival of Keynes’s idea of BANCOR as a world money.
The importance of this is that Keynes’s fundamental recognition of the
basic weakness of the capitalist money system is absolutely central to the pre-
sent crisis. The argument is relatively simple, as it applied to the crisis of the
1930s but I have not seen it being rehearsed in all the articles and correspon-
dence concerning the current crisis. It runs as follows: Keynes distinguished
a consumption sequence in the market and an investment sequence. The first
was determined by what he called “aggregate demand” for goods, the rate of
consumers’ decisions to spend. The second was determined by the rate of
saving for investment, mostly by those richer people and companies with
capital to invest in productive activities. During boom years the proportion
of incomes going to saving rose, so that there were more savings available for
investment, by which Keynes meant actual purchases of capital goods. For a
time capital investment rose, but, if consumption did not rise in line with this
new capacity to invest in producing goods, a crisis arose. Capital investment
in production was suddenly stopped as surplus stocks built up. Those with
capital looked for other uses for their capital.
Keynes argued that there was nothing in the market model to ensure that
the balance between savings and consumption was equal to the balance bet-
ween investment in capital goods and the production of consumption goods.
It was supposed that the rate of interest on savings would act as a regulator
of the balance. But, while a high rate of interest would encourage saving, it
would discourage investment; and a low rate would discourage saving, but
would not necessarily encourage investment. The last would depend upon
the demand for production of consumer goods. In other words, the interest
rate could pull activity down, acting like a piece of string, but string cannot
push things up. Keynes never said that the savers were the richer members of
any society and the consumers the poorer. That would have sounded too
much like Marx’s critique of Capital. 
The chief doubt that Keynes had about the efficacy of lower interest rates
was that when rates were low and there was little or no more demand for con-
sumption, then most savers preferred liquidity, i.e. to hold on to their cash
beyond what was needed for paying debts. This is where everything has chan-
ged since Keynes’s day. He was thinking of a largely closed economy without
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freedom of capital movements. The change is that economic globalisation
means that controls on capital movements have been eliminated, so that hol-
ders of capital –persons and institutions including the banks who once pre-
ferred liquidity can move their funds wherever they can see a profitable
move, which is frequently a speculative activity. A large proportion of the sale
of derivatives takes place across international borders. The other element in
globalisation is the reduction of regulation not only of capital movements but
of risk taking in general. This is what enabled the banks to indulge in the pro-
vision of mortgages without adequate guarantees of repayment, resulting in
the widespread housing crisis in the USA and the UK. Huge sums of money
were earned by the speculators, while the incomes of the mass of the popu-
lation stagnated. Keynes recognised that growing inequality of incomes was
the basic cause of crisis. The poorer people could not consume so much; the
richer could not find so much demand for their capital investment in produc-
tion. In the absence of consumer demand for more goods, what the rich tur-
ned to was speculation, which he did not think was a good thing, as the epi-
graph to this article indicates.
Keynes had noticed that when slump replaced boom, the first and hea-
viest falls took place in the capital investment goods sector as aggregate
demand in the market for consumption goods declined. He therefore recom-
mended governments to spend more money on the production of capital
goods –houses, schools, railways, roads, energy and other parts of an eco-
nomy’s infrastructure. He would certainly not have given state funds to the
bankers who would not necessarily invest it in new production, whether of
capital goods or consumer goods, thus creating new employment. He would
have given it to local government authorities and regional authorities like the
Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA, for providing public and social servi-
ces and construction schemes, as Roosevelt did in following Keynesian mea-
sures in his New Deal legislation to get the US out of the 1930s slump, the
last deep slump before the present one. 
INCOME INEQUALITY
Growing inequality of incomes was recognised by Professor J.K.Galbraith in
his classic work, The Great Crash 1929 as the fundamental cause of the
1930s slump. Between 1922 and 1930 profits in US manufacturing industry
rose in real terms by 130%, while real earning rose by only 17%. Similar figu-
res have been recorded for the US in the last decade, and the previous deca-
de of the 1990s saw an actual fall in real wages while profits boomed. The
British Government has claimed that inequality of incomes was actually redu-
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ced after New Labour took power in 1997. There was a very small reduction
up to 2002 in the difference, between the share of UK incomes of the top 20%
and of the bottom 20%, but the gap widened again thereafter. The distribu-
tion of post-tax incomes between high, medium and low quintiles was almost
exactly the same in 2007/8 as it had been ten years earlier when New Labour
came to power; and this was after Mrs Thatcher and John Major had greatly
widened the inequalities. The rich had continued to become richer, especially
the top few per cent of incomes, and New Labour had done nothing to incre-
ase the taxes on the rich.
The UK was not, however, the only place where inequalities had increased.
The widest gap had opened up in the United States, where profits had risen ste-
adily while wages in real terms had hardly risen over two decades. In the 1990s
similar gaps had opened up elsewhere especially in Latin America, but also in
the areas of economic growth, most especially in China but in India also. The
gap between rich and poor in Russia was unparalleled. Moreover, average inco-
mes in the Developing Countries, as a whole but particularly in Africa, were
falling behind those in the Developed. This was partly due to falling prices of
primary commodities relative to those of finished manufacturers, when
Developing Countries were still dependent on income from their commodity
exports. But other reasons were even more important, associated with the pri-
vatisation of state assets.
Privatisation of public companies had begun by Pinochet in Chile, and
under the Thatcher and Reagan governments in the UK and USA in the 1980s,
but it became widespread in the 1990s. Russia provided the most extreme
example, but the privatising process was taking place elsewhere in Europe,
and most particularly in China and also in Latin America. Instead of raising
taxes, which were unpopular, especially among the rich, governments were
meeting the demands of public spending by selling off state assets. Two rea-
sons were given for these sales. The first was that state enterprises were a
drain on public resources. In fact, World Bank reports record that foreign
borrowing was generally covering any deficits in public accounts in most
Developing Countries; the second was that public enterprise was inefficient.
This reason for privatisation has always been used, and still is adhered to
quite religiously, by British Governments. The late lamented Andrew Glyn in
his major work on British capitalism in 2006 argued that there was no evi-
dence of improved efficiency, in productivity for example, after privatisation
in the UK. Nor can the argument of harmful vested state interest stand up
against similar arguments against crony capitalism. What is clear is that poli-
tical pressures and not any economic rationale were driving privatisation, and
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in Developing Countries the main pressure was coming from the IMF and the
World Bank. The Neo-Liberal consensus had become universal, that the mar-
ket should be left to allocate resources with minimal state regulation and
maximum freedom for capital movements.
THE CHANGED ROLE OF THE BANKS
This has led to a new role being taken by the banks. Instead of simply hol-
ding their customers’ moneys and lending money out beyond the value of
their holdings, at agreed rates of interest related to the official bank rate, in
order to finance business activity, the banks had begun to conduct trading
operations themselves. Much of this has been speculative, buying or borro-
wing company shares in order to sell them at a profit and lending money for
mortgages without guarantees that the mortgage payments could be maintai-
ned. It was, as we have seen, the latter that led to the crisis in the USA and
also in the UK. The bank’s buying of shares, often in very large companies
encouraging a great number of mergers and take-overs, also led to much risk
taking of debt and ultimate bank failures. The development of hedge funds
and private equity groups has been a particularly large element of what Peter
Gowan in a brilliant editorial in New Left Review (no 55 Jan/Feb 2009, pp.5-
29) calls “The New Wall Street System” and has led to the current financial
crisis. Gowan makes it clear that the City of London has not just been an
adjunct of Wall Street but a major player, boasting of the most unregulated
market in the world and in 2007 having a global share of 42.5 % of derivati-
ves (That is to say moneys whose value depends on the value something else,
i.e. varying forms of credit.)
What then should be done with the banks, to start with the British banks?
Just bailing them out hasn’t worked and cannot be made to work with the
banks’ accumulated mass of mortgage and other debt. Money will have to be
made available by government to help those in danger of dispossession of
their homes, but not once more in the hands of the commercial banks. There
is an obvious alternative, which would have popular support –the Post
Office. Closing it down as was originally intended by Lord Mandelson, to
have some of its functions replaced by the giant retail companies, was no
solution. Mandelson has now apparently recognised that the Post Office Bank
needs to be brought into action as an agent of public sector finance, starting
with houses and going on to providing credit for small businesses. This must
be a good move if the commercial banks can be left to return to their original
role. Their shareholders and chief executives could then be made to suffer; it
was they who got us into the mess we are in.
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NEXT STEPS
The international monetary authorities have rightly judged that the UK will
have the greatest difficulty of all states in recovering from the current crisis,
and this for three reasons. The first is the scale of the house mortgage debt; the
second is the extent of British banks’ involvement in hedging and trade in
derivatives; the third is the failure of government fiscal policy, to build up a
surplus in the good years to be available when things went bad. The first two
can only be dealt with by abandoning the commercial banks so that they can-
not repeat past errors and, as already suggested, by reactivating the Post Office
Bank with heavy state support. The third problem of the government deficit
can be overcome by taking ruthless steps to retrieve the vast sums that the rich
have squirreled away in tax havens in British territories, chiefly the Isle of
Man, the Channel Islands, Cayman Islands and the Bahamas. Before becoming
Chancellor Gordon Brown promised to address this leaking of funds, but in
fact it grew steadily year by year under his chancellorship, to a figure quoted
even by the Government Department of Customs and Revenue as amounting
to over £13 billion. Other estimates are much higher, at twice that figure.
What remains to be decided is how to spend the resources available to
government so as to increase employment and offset the increasing loss of
confidence in the British economy, and especially what not to spend money
on. The first and most obvious step is to end the useless and dangerous mili-
tary expenditure in pursuing the war in Afghanistan and replacing the
Trident. But there is a positive alternative. A great window of opportunity
opens up for combining recovery with essential steps to stave off the disas-
trous effects of our wasteful carbon emissions contributing greatly to what is
euphemistically called “climate change”. A massive programme of house
insulation and adaptation needs to be launched, combined with projects for
developing sources of energy from wind, solar and wave power. All such acti-
vities would be highly effective in generating new employment and business
confidence. The agents for managing these programmes and their owners
should be local and regional authorities and specially created and designated
public bodies. The success of Roosevelt’s Tennessee Valley Authority is alre-
ady being recalled by President Obama. 
Gordon Brown who has always loved to learn from United States practi-
ce could now begin to learn from a new President. If he and Alastair Darling
fail to end the “New Wall Street System” in Britain and to set sail on a new
course, it seems possible that the Tories might do it. Philip Blond, director of
the Progressive Conservatism Project at the DEMOS think-tank, has already
in an article in Prospect (February 2009, pp.32-36) proposed some of the
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measures that have been suggested above including a revamped Post Office
Bank. This may have been what persuaded Lord Mandelson to change his
mind about the Post Office. What is for sure is that Mandelson and Brown
have to be held to their promises. There must be a real ban on the rich sal-
ting their money away in tax havens, and the Post Office Bank must be given
the resources to be the major agent of the Government’s recovery program-
me. None of this will happen without a ground swell of support for alterna-
tive policies to end the bankers’ ramp. Massive demonstrations in France and
near civil war in Greece have begun to be echoed by the strike of construc-
tion and power workers in East Anglia with sympathy actions elsewhere
especially in Wales and Scotland. At some point, anger will have to be turned
into positive action, and no better starting point could be found in Britain
than rescuing the Post Office and funnelling state support for economic reco-
very through the Post Office Bank.
Michael Barratt Brown20
Obets. Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. 5, n.º 1, 2010; pp. 13-20
